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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the viability of community banks.  The results indicate that larger community 
banks are more profitable and less susceptible to most forms of risk than smaller community banks.  
Evidence that smaller community banks are more relationship oriented and larger community banks 
are more transactional oriented is mixed.  Smaller community banks have a lower cost of funding 
assets, perhaps as a result of a stronger relationship with depositors, but there is no evidence that 
their relationship with borrowers allows them to earn more interest income.  The primary indication 
of a stronger transactional orientation by larger community banks is their ability to generate more 
non-interest income. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
hile larger banks typically operate in regional or national markets, community banks generally 
restrict their activities within more narrowly defined geographic limits.  It is critically important to 
understand whether community banks will be able to survive recent trends brought on by banking 
industry consolidation.  This is a public policy concern because community banks are often associated with small 
business lending and local community development.  Erosion of the viability of community banks could potentially 
reduce the availability of credit to small businesses or result in rising fees imposed on consumers.
1
  The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the viability of community banks, and to compare the behavior of different size community 
banks to discern evidence of differing managerial strategies and performance that may be relevant to their survival.  
 
COMMUNITY BANKS—DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Community banks are generally categorized in the literature as institutions with less than $1 billion in assets.  
They are generally perceived to be smaller institutions because of their narrower geographic and product focus in 
comparison to larger banks which tend to operate on a regional or national scale offering a broader range of products 
and services.  In the year 2004 there were 730 ―community banks‖ with assets less than $1 billion and just 31 larger 
banks with assets in excess of $1 billion operating in the Dallas Federal Reserve District.  While far more numerous, 
the community banks held only 44% of all banking assets in the Dallas FED. 
  
The current imbalance between the distribution of banking establishments and banking assets can be 
attributed to a number of factors.  Most important of these factors are consolidations resulting from sweeping 
legislative changes
2
 which led to widespread geographic and product deregulation, and extraordinary technological 
transformations
3
 in the banking industry over the last 20 years.   
  
W 
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Several arguments support the notion that community banks cannot adequately compete with larger banking 
organizations.  Small size may prevent management from investing sufficient amounts in new technologies to 
compete more effectively.  Berger (2003) discusses a number of factors that may prevent smaller banks from 
adequately diversifying credit risk and thereby making long-term success less likely.
4
  Another argument relates to the 
essential function of an intermediary in gathering, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the information necessary 
to facilitate the flow of funds from lenders to borrowers.  While dramatic advances in technology have made gathering 
and analyzing information less costly, thereby reducing the value of the intermediary function,
5
 the prevailing 
sentiment in the literature generally assumes that larger organizations have a comparative advantage in accessing 
valuable information for facilitating transactions.  Finally, there is the argument that smaller banks are unable to take 
advantage of economies of scale that enable larger banks to reduce costs of providing services.   
 
 If the arguments listed above are valid, further industry consolidation would seem to be an inevitable trend.  
There is, however, also evidence of countervailing community bank trends.  Continued entry of de novo banks into the 
industry
6
 and continued growth of existing small community banks (Bassett and Brady 2001) suggests that there may 
be reasons why community banks will continue to survive and prosper.  Recent academic research provides 
conflicting evidence on whether or not significant cost differentials exist for larger and more diversified banks (Berger 
and Humphrey 1999).  As a result, there is no consensus about what size of bank, or what banking organizational 
structure, provides the greatest efficiency.  
 
Differences In Strategic Managerial Orientation 
 
 Community banks are generally portrayed or modeled in the literature as homogeneous financial 
intermediaries in comparisons with larger commercial banks.  But that perspective may mislead and mask important 
differences among community banks that affect their long-term viability. 
 
 Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991), and Rajan (1992) emphasize that not all financial intermediaries collect and 
analyze information in the same way.  They argue that differences in strategic managerial orientation, such as a 
relationship banking orientation or a transactional banking orientation, may provide banks with distinct comparative 
cost advantages and explain important differences in behavior and performance that affect their viability.  
Relationship banking is generally associated with smaller banks and transactional banking is typically associated with 
larger banking entities. 
 
Relationship Banking Orientation 
 
 Relationship oriented bank managers place greater emphasis on long-term customer relationships and 
providing personal banking service to customers.  A relationship banking orientation involves the use of personal one-
on-one understanding and knowledge between the parties. 
 
 On the lending side, relationship banking places emphasis on human-aided transactions.  In making lending 
decisions, bank employees develop and exploit so-called ―soft‖ information7  that is not readily available or easily 
quantifiable.  Soft information requires more human discretion and evaluation and is acquired primarily by working in 
close contact with the banking customer.  Relationship-oriented borrowers value the intimate knowledge their banker 
has of their personal situation.  They prefer to deal consistently with the same individuals whom they do not have to 
frequently re-educate about their own unique financial and business situation. Such customers may be willing to pay 
relatively higher rates for loans, or the same rate with a reduced level of ancillary service. 
 
 In many smaller companies, financial statements are not standardized and management may lack the 
financial expertise needed to participate in financial transactions.  Lenders to these companies need to evaluate ―soft‖ 
information in making a credit decision to such customers.  The lender may also add real value by providing 
accounting, business planning, and tax planning expertise—cross-selling noncredit products and services in order to 
lock in or enhance the relationship.
8
  The familiarity between borrower and lender facilitates long term transactions, 
negating the need to begin the information search anew every time a loan is extended.  These services generally 
require localized decision making.  In attempting to exploit information that is difficult to assess and evaluate, the loan 
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officer must be given the latitude and ability to act on this information without the approval of those further removed 
from the situation.  Relationship lending thus provides a niche for community institutions that many large banks find 
less attractive or are less capable of filling—see Berger and Udell (1995, 2002) and Scott and Dunkelberg (2004). 
 
 Berger and Udell (2002) argue that banks offering relationship lending must delegate more lending authority 
to their loan officers than do banks that focus on transactional lending.  They also contend that small community 
banks are better able to resolve problems associated with delegating authority than large banks, meaning they should 
be better equipped to engage in relationship lending than large banks.  
 
 Most small bank stock is privately held rather than publicly traded while large bank stock is generally 
publicly traded.  That means the ownership of small banks is more concentrated in the hands of fewer stockholders 
whereas ownership of large banks is more widely dispersed.  At small banks where ownership is more concentrated, 
owners are more actively involved in managing the banks.  For example, Brickley, Linck, and Smith (2003) show that 
small bank ownership in Texas is much more concentrated than it is for large banks.  Officers and directors of small 
banks owned roughly two-thirds of their banks’ stock while the officers and directors of the large banks in their 
sample owned only about one-quarter of the stock.  
 
 The fact that local decision makers in small banks own relatively more stock in the banks and are more 
actively involved in the banks’ management mitigates agency problems.  Brickley, Linck, and Smith (2003) argue that 
this setup allows smaller banks to grant local managers more decision authority.  Allowing the person who acquires 
soft information on a borrower to act upon the information makes it easier for smaller banks to engage in relationship 
lending.  This line of reasoning is similar to that of Berger and Udell (2002), who argue that stockholders in large 
banks, who are more dispersed and not local, are less willing to grant decision-making authority to local managers and 
prefer instead to use more bureaucratic rules for decision making.  
 
Transactional Banking Orientation 
 
 Transactional banking is oriented toward the provision of intermediation services on the basis of more 
formulaic, impersonal rules.  Because these transactional products are generally highly standardized, easily available, 
and reliable, they require little human discretion in their provision. 
 
 For transactional banking, hard information drives the intermediation process. Frame, Srinivasan, and 
Woosley (2001) provide evidence that large banks increasingly use the process of incorporating hard information into 
quantitative decision-making models for credit scoring purposes.  Based on this so-called hard information, the results 
from such models are then used to make decisions regarding business loans.  This credit scoring process is more 
mechanical in that it involves less human input, thereby eliminating the need for more personalized input from local 
loan officers. 
 
 To the extent that loans to small businesses, agriculture customers, and individuals can be successfully credit 
scored over time, relationship oriented banks will face increasing competition in their loan portfolios from 
transactional oriented banks. However, the use of credit scoring systems generally does not allow the provision of real 
value from the banker, as described above. 
 
 With credit approval from analysts far removed from the borrower and decision making concentrated among 
fewer entities, large banks can offer more attractive rates to their most profitable customers.  Less profitable customers 
may receive the same stated rate, but are often given access to a reduced level of service thus ultimately paying higher 
real fees and rates.  Yet many customers do not need or want a broad array of credit, deposit, insurance, and trust 
services from their bank. 
 
 The typical bank engages in both types of lending—transactional and relationship.  Though the two types are 
not necessarily substitutes for each other, larger banks are more likely to adhere to a transactional approach in their 
operations while smaller banks would be more inclined to focus on relationship banking.  Transactional banking is 
generally associated with economies of scale because unit costs fall with increasing bank size.  The section that 
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follows examines the question of whether smaller community banks operate differently from larger community banks 
and whether these differences can be linked to a relationship or transactional orientation.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 Others have focused on differences between community banks and large banking organizations.
9
  We seek to 
discern whether there are important distinctions between smaller and larger community banks. 
 
 The data set compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation includes all 761 FDIC insured 
commercial banks and thrifts operating in the Dallas Federal Reserve District in 2004.  Since the general demarcation 
in the literature for identifying community banks is those institutions with less than $1 billion in assets, the analysis 
that follows focuses on the 730 institutions in the FDIC database below that asset size limit. 
 
 For the 730 community banks in the sample, the median asset size was $80 million.  This breakpoint was 
used to divide the sample into two comparison groups of community banks.  The 365 banks with assets less than $80 
million are categorized as ―smaller community banks‖.  The 365 banks with assets greater than $80 million, but less 
than $1 billion, are categorized as ―larger community banks‖. 
 
 To gain insight regarding the viability of community banks and possible differences in strategic managerial 
orientation between the smaller and larger community banks, traditional t-test procedures are used to analyze 
differences in operating characteristics across the two different size categories.  We examine whether characteristics 
indicative of relationship banking are associated with the sample of smaller community banks and whether 
characteristics indicative of transactional banking are associated with the sample of larger community banks. 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 
 Results of statistical tests for differences in the characteristics and performance of the comparison groups of 
smaller and larger community banks are shown in Table 1.  The mean asset size is nearly $46 million for the smallest 
365 community banks in the sample, and almost $226 million for the largest 365 community banks in the sample. 
 
Average Expense Ratios 
 
 The expenses of banking institutions may be divided into to broad categories—interest expense and non-
interest expense.  Both are compared in the table as a share of earning assets for the two groups of community banks.   
 
 The ratio of interest expense to earning assets is the annualized total interest expense paid on deposits and 
other borrowed money as a percent of average earning assets on a consolidated basis.  This ratio can also be viewed as 
the ―cost of funding assets‖.  Interest expense (cost of funding loan assets) is lower for the smaller community banks 
than for the larger community banks.  This result might be expected if smaller community banks are able to induce 
depositors to accept lower interest rates on their deposits as a result of a relationship banking strategy.  Larger 
community banks with a more transactional orientation must pay higher interest rates to attract deposits from 
customers with which they have a weaker personal relationship. 
 
 The ratio of non-interest expense to earning assets is the total cost of salaries and employee benefits, 
expenses of premises and fixed assets, and other non-interest expenses (annualized) as a percent of average earning 
assets.  No significant differences in non-interest expenses were found when comparing the samples of smaller and 
larger community banks.  This result suggests that, on average, the group of larger community banks was unable to 
achieve economies of scale (lower non-interest costs) if they were indeed adopting a more transactional banking 
orientation. 
 
 The assets per employee ratio measures total assets in millions of dollars as a percent of the number of full-
time equivalent employees.  The reciprocal of this ratio suggests that smaller community banks appear to have higher 
labor input requirements than larger community banks.  This is consistent with a more labor-intensive relationship 
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banking orientation by smaller community banks and a less labor-intensive transactional orientation by larger 
community banks. 
 
Average Income Ratios 
 
 The income of banking institutions can also be divided into two broad categories—interest income and non-
interest income.  Both are compared as a share of earning assets for the two groups of community banks. 
 
 The ratio of interest income to earning assets is the total interest income (annualized) as a percent of average 
earning assets.  It can also be viewed as the yield on assets.  There is no significant difference between the two groups 
of community banks in the interest income (yield on assets).  This suggests that, on average, the explicit or nominal 
interest rate charged on loans does not differ significantly for smaller and larger community banks.  If smaller 
community banks are more relationship oriented, there is no evidence that it enables them to charge higher nominal 
loan rates. 
 
 The ratio of non-interest income to earning assets is income derived from bank services and sources other 
than interest bearing assets (annualized) as a percent of average earning assets.  Larger community banks earn more 
non-interest income than smaller community banks.  This is consistent with a transactional orientation by larger 
community banks leading to greater reliance on fee income.
10
   
 
Efficiency Ratio 
 
 The efficiency ratio reported in the table measures non-interest expense, less the amortization expense of 
intangible assets, as a percent of the sum of net interest income and non-interest income.  It indicates that on average, 
larger community banks are more efficient than smaller community banks.  From the results reported above, it appears 
this outcome results from larger community banks generating more non-interest income than smaller community 
banks. 
 
Profitability Ratios 
 
 Comparisons of five profitability ratios are shown in the table.  These ratios are defined as follows: 
 
 Net Operating Income to Assets = Net operating income (annualized) as a percent of average assets. 
 Return on Assets = Net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a percent of average total 
assets. 
 Pretax Return on Assets = Annualized pre-tax net income as a percent of average assets.  (Includes 
extraordinary items and other adjustments net of taxes.) 
 Return on Equity (ROE) = Annualized net income as a percent of average equity on a consolidated basis.  (If 
retained earnings are negative, the ratio is treated as not available.) 
 Retained Earnings to Average Equity = Net income (year-to-date, annualized), as a percent of average total 
equity capital.  (If retained earnings are negative, the ratio is treated as not available.)   
 
All profitability comparisons indicate that larger community banks are more profitable than smaller 
community banks. 
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Table 1 
Differences In Selected Mean Ratios For Small And Large Community Banks In The 
Dallas Federal Reserve District, 2004. 
 
         
 Smaller Larger   
Variable Community Community   
Description Banks* Banks** t-Value P > |t| 
     
Number of Community Banks 365 365   
Average Total Assets ($ millions) $45.609 $225.885 -18.48 0.0000 
     
Average Expense Ratios:     
Interest Expense to Earning Assets 0.0112 0.0128 -3.79 0.0002 
Non-interest Expense to Earning Assets 0.0395 0.0395 0.01 0.9901 
Assets per Employee ($ millions) 2.722 3.127 -2.99 0.0029 
     
Average Income Ratios:     
Interest Income to Earning Assets 0.0541 0.0552 -1.34 0.1796 
Non-interest Income to  Earning Assets 0.0104 0.0158 -1.95 0.0510 
Non-operating Income to Assets 0.0009 0.0012 -3.34 0.0009 
     
Average Efficiency Ratio: 0.7738 0.6572 4.48 0.0000 
     
Average Profitability Ratios:     
Net Operating Income to Assets 0.0088 0.0121 -4.71 0.0000 
Return on Assets 0.0090 0.0123 -4.65 0.0000 
Pretax Return on Assets 0.0104 0.0153 -6.11 0.0000 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.0887 0.1319 -5.78 0.0000 
Retained Earnings to Average Equity 0.0287 0.0585 -3.97 0.0000 
     
Average Risk Ratios:     
Noncurrent Loans to Loans 0.0119 0.0069 5.10 0.0000 
Noncurrent Assets Plus Other Real Estate Owned to Assets 0.0079 0.0054 3.58 0.0004 
Loss Allowance to Loans 0.0165 0.0121 6.88 0.0000 
Net Charge-offs to Loans 0.0039 0.0024 2.40 0.0167 
Volatile Liabilities to Assets 0.1615 0.1954 -3.23 0.0013 
Notes: 
 *   Small community banks are defined as those with less then $80 million in total assets.   
 **  Large community banks are defined as those with more than $80 million, but less than $1 billion in total assets.   
Data Source:  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Credit Union Administration, 2004. 
 
 
Risk Ratios 
 
 Five measures of credit risk are compared in the table. These measures are defined as follows: 
 
 Noncurrent Loans to Loans = Loans and leases 90 days or more past due plus loans in nonaccrual status, as a 
percent of gross loans and leases. 
 Noncurrent Assets Plus Other Real Estate Owned to Assets:  Noncurrent assets are defined as assets that are 
past due 90 days or more plus assets placed in nonaccrual status plus other real estate owned (excluding 
direct and indirect investments in real estate). 
 Loss Allowance to Loans = Allowance for loan and lease losses as a percent of total loan and lease financing 
receivables, excluding unearned income. 
 Net Charge-offs to Loans = Gross loan and lease financing receivable charge-offs, less gross recoveries, 
(annualized) as a percent of average total loans and lease financing receivables. 
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 Volatile Liabilities to Assets = The sum of large-denomination time deposits, foreign-office deposits, federal 
funds purchased, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, and other borrowings.  Trading liabilities, 
less revaluation losses on assets held in trading accounts are included. 
 
The credit risk measures suggest that the risk from loan default and noncurrent assets is greater for the 
smaller community banks than the larger community banks.  Risk from volatile liabilities is greater at larger 
community banks. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 It appears that larger community banks are more economically viable than smaller community banks.  The 
larger community banks are more profitable and less susceptible to most forms of risk than smaller community banks. 
 
 Evidence that smaller community banks are more relationship oriented is mixed.  Smaller community banks 
have a lower cost of funding assets (lower interest expense), perhaps as a result of a stronger relationship with 
depositors.  However, there is no evidence that their relationship with borrowers allows them to charge higher loan 
rates (earn more interest income).  The primary evidence of a stronger transactional orientation by larger community 
banks is their ability to generate more non-interest income. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Future research focusing on identifying more empirically measurable characteristics for distinguishing 
relationship and transactional orientation among banking institutions could help further clarify issues examined in this 
paper. The geographic scope of this paper was limited to one particular region of the country. Expanding the scope on 
a national basis would enhance the generality of the paper’s findings.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Federal Reserve Bank surveys consistently show that large banking organizations charge higher fees than community 
banks—see Hannan (2002) and Berger and Udell (2002).  Scott and Dunkelberg (2004) provide evidence that credit 
service for small business firms is better at community banks than at large banks. 
2. The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency (Riegle-Neal) Act of 1994 resulted in the elimination of restrictions 
against interstate and intrastate banking.  The Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act in 1999 
resulted in more product deregulation. 
3. Berger and Mester (2003) and Allen, McAndrews, and Strahan (2002) provide discussions on technological change and 
banking. 
4. Yeager (2004) provides evidence that the geographic concentration risk that community banks must bear is not 
responsible for the declining numbers of community banks in the United States. 
5. Petersen and Rajan (2002), for example, provide evidence that small businesses are now better able to borrow from more 
physically distant lenders than they were in the past.  
6. DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and DeYoung (1999) discuss and present evidence on de novo banks.   
7. Information can be differentiated as being ―hard‖ or ―soft‖.  Hard information consists of easily verifiable facts that can 
be credibly shared.  Soft information consists of the personal opinions of an individual evaluator who knows the person 
whose information is being evaluated.  Many argue that community banks are better equipped to produce soft 
information than are larger banks—see Berger and Udell (2002), Scott (2004), and Scott and Dunkelberg (2004).   
8. DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2003) discuss relationship lending from the perspective of bankers having access to soft 
information acquired through personal contact with the borrower.  While we do not disagree that this element is 
important to relationship banking at community banks, our definition is broader, emphasizing that the lender may be 
additionally providing value associated with tax, accounting, and other expertise as well as funds. 
9. DeYoung (2003) provides a recent study of the viability of community banks.  
10. Non-interest income includes income from fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, trading revenues, 
investment banking fees, venture capital revenue, servicing fees, securitization income, and insurance commissions and 
fees. 
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